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NOTES 
LABOR LAW-The Permissible Scope of the National Labor 
Relations Board's Rule Against Relitigation 
Under section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or 
Act),1 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) is 
charged with the responsibility of determining what group of em-
ployees constitutes an appropriate unit for purposes of collective bar-
gaining with an employer. While the Board itself originally handled 
representation petitions and determined appropriate bargaining 
units, Congress in 1959 amended the NLRA and authorized the 
Board to delegate its section 9 powers to the regional directors in 
order to expedite NLRB operations.2 Pursuant to this authorization, 
and in accordance with its rule-making authority under section 6 of 
the Act, 8 the Board issued a series of rules and regulations to govern 
the regional directors in the exercise of their delegated responsibili-
ties.4 In order to effectuate the expeditious resolution of representa-
tion issues, rule 102.67 (f) established what has become known as the 
Board's "rule against relitigation."5 Through application of this rule, 
certain issues that are decided by regional directors in representation 
proceedings under section 9-and that are subsequently affirmed 
either by the Board's denial of a request for review6 or by the failure 
of the aggrieved party to seek such review-are foreclosed from 
Board consideration in subsequent related unfair labor practice pro-
ceedings co!lducted under section 10 of the Act.7 The effect of this 
1. 29 U.S.C. § I59(b) (1964). 
2. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 [hereinafter 
LMRDA], Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 70I(b), 73 Stat. 542, amended § 3(b) of the National 
Labor Relations Act [hereinafter NLRA], codified in 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1964), to 
provide in part: 
• • • The Board is also authorized to delegate to its regional directors its powers 
under section 159 of this title to determine the unit appropriate for the purpose 
of collective bargaining, to investigate and provide for hearings, and determine 
whether a question of representation exists, and to direct an election or take a 
secret ballot under subsection (c) or (e) of section 159 of this title and certify the 
results thereof, except that upon the filing of a request therefor with the Board 
by any interested person, the Board may review any action of a regional director 
delegated to him under this paragraph, but such a review shall not, unless 
specifically ordered by the Board, operate as a stay of any action taken by the 
regional director •••• 
3. 29 u.s.c. § 156 (1964). 
4. 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.60•.72 (1970). 
5. 29 C,F.R. § 102.67(£) (1970) provides: 
The parties may, at any time, waive their right to request review. Failure to 
request review shall preclude such parties from relitigating, in any related subse-
quent unfair labor practice proceedmg, any issue which was, or could have been, 
raised in the representation proceeding. Denial of a request for review shall 
constitute an aflirmance of the regional director's action which shall also preclude 
relitigating any such issues in any related subsequent unfair labor practice 
proceeding. 
6. 29 C.F.R. § 101.2l(d) (1970). 
7. NLRA § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964), empowers the National Labor Relations Board 
[569] 
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rule is to relieve the Board of its statutory function of determining 
the existence or absence of unfair labor practices.8 This res judicata 
feature of the rule against relitigation has produced a conflict in recent 
decisions by the Courts of Appeals for the First and Second Circuits 
in NLRB v. Magnesium Casting Company9 and Pepsi-Cola Buffalo 
Bottling Company v. NLRB.10 These cases reflect a fundamental 
perceptual difference concerning the congressional purpose behind 
(NLRB or Board) to determine and remedy unfair labor practices, which are defined 
in § 8 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964). The proscribed activity most germane to 
this Note involves an employer's refusal to bargain with a union that has been 
certified as the representative of a group of employees for purposes of collective 
bargaining after winning an election that was directed by an NLRB regional director. 
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964). See text accompanying notes 12-23 infra. The problem 
dealt with in this Note results from the manner in which the rule against relitigation 
has been generally applied. Although the rule could arguably be applied to collateral-
estoppel situations-i.e., cases in which the unfair labor practice is not directly related 
to the prior § 9 determination-the actual operational parameters of the rule are 
significantly narrower than the broad language of rule 102.67(£) might indicate. Court 
and NLRB invocations of the rule have heretofore confined its importance to res 
judicata situations, where the refusals to bargain have arisen as a direct result of prior 
representation proceedings. For example, in NLRB v. Union Bros., Inc., 403 F.2d 883, 
887 n.8 (4th Cir. 1968), the court noted: "Application of the board's rule, § 102.67(£) 
[29 C.F.R. § 102.67(£) (1970)), prohibiting relitigation of issues decided in representation 
proceedings has not been sanctioned when an unfair labor practice, other than a refusal 
to bargain, is charged." See also Leonard Niederriter Co., 130 NL.R.B. 113, 115 (1961), 
in which the Board noted that findings in an earlier representation proceeding did 
not conclusively settle a status question in a § IO case when the later unfair labor 
practice dispute stemmed from something other than a refusal to bargain based upon 
disagreement with the prior § 9 decision; and Amalgamated Clothing Workers v, 
NLRB, 365 F.2d 898, 903-05 (D.C. Cir. 1966), discussed in text accompanying notes 
105-07 infra. 
8. NLRA § IO(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964), provides in part: 
••• If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the 
opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in 
any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact 
and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such 
person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice .••• If • • • the Board 
shall not be of the opinion that the person named in the complaint has engaged 
in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its 
findings of fact and shall issue an order dismissing the said complaint. , •• 
See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.9-.59 (1970). 
9. 427 F.2d 114 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 39 U.SL.W. 3146 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1970) (No. 
370). 
10. 409 F.2d 676 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969). 
For an earlier decision dealing with the controversial policies behind the rule, see 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 158 (1941), discussed in note 108 
infra. 
A major source of dissatisfaction with the rule has been the lack of a right to 
judicial review of a regional director's decision unless a petition is filed pursuant to 
§§ 9(d) and l0(e) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(d), 160(e) (1964), for review or enforce-
ment of a bargaining order based on a finding of a § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964), 
violation arising from a refusal to bargain by the aggrieved employer. See Boire v. 
Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964); American Fedn. of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 
401 (1940). The § 8(a)(5) route has become the accepted method of challenging such 
representation determinations. See, e.g., Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964); 
NLRB v. Magnesium Casting Co., 427 F.2d 114 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 39 U.SL.W. 
3146 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1970) (No. 370). 
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the 1959 delegation authorization, the use of the rule against relitiga-
tion to effectuate that purpose, and the propriety of the rule's effect 
on unfair labor practice proceedings under section 10.11 
In Pepsi, a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals announced a restrictive view of the permissible use of the rule 
against relitigation.12 The problem in Pepsi involved a union at-
tempt to gain recognition as the bargaining representative for a 
bottling company's employees.13 In order to deliver its products 
throughout the market region, the company used a system of fifty-
four "distributors"-individuals who owned or leased trucks and 
carried the soft drinks to various retail stores.14 The union's petition 
for certification included these individuals in the proposed bargain-
ing unit. Pepsi-Cola challenged the petition on the ground that the 
distributors were independent contractors and consequently in-
eligible for inclusion in the employee unit.15 Following a representa-
tion hearing, the acting regional director decided that the fifty-four 
distributors were employees of the company for purposes of the 
NLRA, and ordered a representation election covering the unit that 
included the challenged individuals.16 Pepsi-Cola disputed the re-
gional director's decision and petitioned for NLRB review.17 The 
Board dismissed the petition on the ground that the issues raised 
were not sufficiently substantial to warrant review.18 After the union 
won the election and was certified by the Board as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative for Pepsi-Cola's employees, the company con-
tinued to contest the decisions on the status of its distributors and 
sought reconsideration of that issue by refusing to bargain with the 
union. As anticipated, the employer was charged with an unfair labor 
practice consisting of an unlawful refusal to bargain in violation of 
11. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964). See note 7 supra. 
12. 409 F .2d 676 (2d Cir. 1969). 
13. 409 F.2d at 677. The union involved was District 50, United Mine Workers of 
America. 
14. 409 F.2d at 677. 
15. 409 F.2d at 678. "Independent contractors" are not included within the definition 
of "employee" for purposes of the NLRA. NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964). 
16. 409 F.2d at 678. 
17. 409 F.2d at 678. Requirements for the granting of review of a regional director's 
decision are defined in Board rules 102.67(b), (c), and (d), 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.67(b), (c), (d) 
(1970). Subsection (b) requires that the request be filed within ten days after the service 
of the regional director's d~cision. Subsection (c) provides that the Board will grant 
review only when one or more of the following compelling reasons exist: (I) a sub-
stantial question of law or policy raised by the absence of or departure from official 
Board precedent; (2) a clearly erroneous decision on the facts; (3) misconduct of the 
hearing resulting in prejudicial error; (4) compelling reasons for reconsideration of a 
Board rule or policy. Subsection (d) requires that the request contain summaries of 
evidence and argument sufficient to allow the Board to make a ruling without actual 
recourse to the record, 
18. 409 F.2d at 678. 
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section 8(a)(5) of the Act.19 In responding to the complaint, the com-
pany conceded the refusal to bargain, but claimed that it was entitled 
to further hearings on the inclusion of the distributors in the bar-
gaining unit. In the ensuing unfair labor practice hearing, the Gen-
eral Counsel for the NLRB moved for summary judgment against 
Pepsi-Cola.2° Citing the rule against relitigation, he argued that the 
regional director's decision on the issue of distributors' status was 
final, that the Board's previous denial of review constituted affirm-
ance of the decision, and that the regional director's decision was 
therefore res judicata on the issue for purposes of the unfair labor 
practice hearing.21 The trial examiner agreed with the General 
Counsel, and hence granted the motion for summary judgment and 
ordered the company to bargain with the union.22 Following Board 
affirmance, Pepsi-Cola petitioned the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for relief.23 
The court perceived the issue before it in terms of administrative 
convenience and congressional intent: "We are thus called upon to 
reconcile the Board's need to keep its house in an efficient manner 
by standards it believes will achieve that end with a litigant's right 
to have his case adjudicated by the persons Congress has chosen to 
make final decisions in labor cases."24 Feeling that the latter con-
sideration deserved to be accorded more weight than the former, the 
court remanded the case for further Board proceedings concerning 
the status of the distributors.25 It held that in unfair labor practice 
proceedings that are related to section 9 determinations the Board 
must at least review the record before the regional director on such 
issues as employee status: "we seek only to insure that, before taking 
the serious step of declaring that an employer has committed an un-
fair labor practice, the Board will simply review the record before the 
Regional Director to determine whether his decision was correct, and 
not merely whether it was clearly erroneous.''26 
Essentially, the court's criticism was directed at the Board's 
procedure and standards for reviewing or not reviewing regional-
director decisions and the resulting res judicata effect of unre-
viewed decisions in subsequent related unfair labor practice cases. 
This Board procedure was deemed unacceptable because it merely 
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964). 
20. 409 F.2d at 679. 
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964), and 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.9-.59 (1970) for the procedure 
employed in preventing unfair labor practices. 
22. 409 F.2d at 679. 
23. 409 F.2d at 679. Any person who believes himself aggrieved by a final order 
of the Board may seek review of such order in an appropriate United States court 
of appeals. NLRA § 10(£), 29 U.S.C. § 160(£) (1964). 
24. 409 F.2d at 679. 
25. 409 F .2d at 682. 
26. 409 F.2d at 681. 
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gave "rubber-stamped" approval of such decisions, and thereby per-
mitted regional directors to decide unfair labor practice cases despite 
Congress' intention that the Board should make such decisions.27 The 
court stated: 
The Board seeks to use the rule against relitigation to carve out an 
exception for unfair labor practices that happen to arise in the 
context of a representation dispute, though conceding that if this 
unfair labor proceeding arose independently of the representation 
dispute the petitioner would have been entitled to full review by 
the Board of the Hearing Examiner's findings of fact and conclusion 
of law.28 
Although not requiring a de novo hearing on the issues delegated to 
the regional director, the court indicated that the rule against reliti-
gation improperly relieves the Board of its statutory responsibilities 
when a representation issue is "difficult and requires a fine-drawn 
balancing of facts and law.''29 In support of this position, the court 
emphasized that the Board's "experience is particularly relevant and 
desirable in deciding complex [representation] issues ... before the 
potent sanctions arising from the finding of an unfair labor practice 
are invoked."30 While the court provided no definitive standards 
concerning the required extent of Board review of regional-director 
dedsions,31 it clearly held that at least in situations similar to that 
in Pepsi the Board cannot confer res judicata effect-:--as contemplated 
by the rule against relitigation--on representation decisions orig-
inally reviewed under the "substantial question," "clearly errone-
ous," "prejudicial error," and "compelling reason" criteria established 
by subsection (c) of Board rule 102.67.32 
The controlling factor in the Pepsi decision was the perceived 
effect of the rule against relitigation on the congressional policy, 
manifested in section 10 of the NLRA, that the Board determine the 
existence of unfair labor practices. Although the court recognized 
27. 409 F.2d at 679. See text accompanying note 21 supra. 
28. 409 F.2d at 680. 
29. 409 F.2d at 679. 
l!0. 409 F.2d at 680. Regarding difficulties encountered in determining independent-
contractor questions, see Adelstein 8e Edwards, The Resurrection of NLRB v. Hearst: 
Independent Contractors Under the National Labor Relations Act, 17 KAN. L. REY. 
191 (1969). 
l!l. Language in the Pepsi opinion would seem to indicate that the Board must 
independently redecide a representation issue whenever such issue subsequently affects 
an unfair labor practice determination. The court commented that the 1959 delegation 
of authority was to be "subject to the safeguard of plenary review by the Board at the 
unfair labor practice stage." 409 F.2d at 681 (emphasis added). "Plenary review" would 
seem to indicate a system in which the agency gives full and complete reconsideration 
to exceptions to regional-director decisions. However, the opinion does not discuss 
specifically the nature and extent of such review. 
!!2. See note 17 supra. 
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that the 1959 amendment manifested a desire to hasten Board opera-
tions, 33 it emphasized repeatedly that the Board had been given the 
responsibility for deciding unfair labor practice cases, and that it is 
improper to use a rule that allows the Board's delegate in effect to 
make such a decision.34 Aside from the actual language of section 
10,35 the principal support for the court's conclusions was drawn 
from Congress' rejection in 1961 of a proposal that would have per-
mitted the delegation of the Board's unfair labor practice authority 
to the regional clirectors.36 Equating the effect of the rejected pro-
posal with the res judicata effect on unfair labor practice cases that 
the rule against relitigation gave to regional-director decisions, the 
court concluded that it was contrary to congressional policy to "au-
thorize all hearing examiners [ and by implication regional directors] 
to render final, unreviewable decisions."37 Viewing the rule as a mis-
taken implementation of the 1959 amendment,38 the court rejected 
the practical operation of the rule, saying, "[w]e see no basis for thus 
mutilating the legislative scheme. The consequences of committing 
an unfair labor practice are the same no matter what the source of 
the dispute."39 
The holding in Pepsi was further amplified and refined in subse-
quent circuit court cases, including one in which the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals reconsidered the problem.40 Three cases decided 
outside the Second Circuit dealt with the Pepsi issue in dicta. In 
NLRB v. Chelsea Clock Company,41 a case decided on grounds in-
dependent of the Pepsi rationale, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
cited Pepsi as authority for the proposition that the Board cannot 
delegate to regional directors the authority to render "ultimate 
decisions" in unfair labor practice cases.42 In State Farm Mutual 
33. 409 F .2d at 681. 
34. 409 F.2d at 679-81. 
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964) (set out in pertinent part in note 8 supra); Uni-
versal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). 
36. 409 F.2d at 681. For a discussion of this proposal, see Auerbach, Scope of 
Authority of Federal Administrative Agencies To Delegate Decision Making to Hearing 
Examiners, 48 MINN. L. REv. 823, 865 (1964). In essence, the proposal would have 
allowed Board agents-hearing officers or trial examiners--to render final decisions 
in § 10 cases subject only to discretionary review by the Board. Auerbach included a 
complete documentation of the legislative history of the proposal. Id. at 839-40 n.61. 
37. 409 F.2d at 681. 
38. The 1959 amendment to NLRA § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1964), is set out in 
note 2 supra and discussed in the text accompanying notes 2-8 supra. 
39. 409 F.2d at 680. 
40. NLRB v. Olson Bodies, Inc., 420 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 38 
U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. June 9, 1970) (No. 1670, 1969 Term; renumbered No. 238, 1970 
Term). See notes 51-57 infra and accompanying text. 
41. 411 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1969). 
42. 411 F.2d at 192. 
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Automobile Insurance Company v. NLRB43 the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals also interpreted the Pepsi decision. Although that 
case, which involved a dispute over an employee's status, was also 
decided on non-Pepsi grounds,44 the court rendered an interesting 
construction of the Pepsi doctrine: "In Pepsi-Cola the court held 
that the Board failed to perform its statutory function of indepen-
dently determining the 'crucial issue'-whether Pepsi-Cola's distrib-
utors were employees."45 Similarly, in NLRB v. Clement-Blythe 
Companies,46 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals read Pepsi as 
requiring a Board determination of underlying representation issues 
in related unfair labor practice cases. That court reversed the Board 
because of the Board's failure to follow the requirements of section 8 
of the Administrative Procedure Act47 by not providing the required 
statement of findings and conclusions when ruling that the company 
had committed an unfair labor practice.48 Although the court in 
dictum interpreted the Pepsi decision as not requiring the NLRB to 
conduct a de novo hearing at the unfair labor practice stage on a 
representation issue previously decided by a regional director, it did 
say that in such cases "the Board must thoroughly review the record 
before the Regional Director and make its own decision."49 Thus, 
the Fourth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals apparently feel 
that the NLRB has a broad duty to review extensively the factual 
and legal basis of a previously unreviewed regional director's repre-
sentation decision when it arises in a subsequent related unfair labor 
practice proceeding. 
Neither the Pepsi decision nor any of the three subsequent cases 
discussed above specified the exact extent of Board review that is re-
quired in unfair labor practice proceedings that are related to a 
representation issue previously decided by a regional director in a 
section 9 hearing. However, all four decisions stressed the desirability 
of having the Board independently redetermine the underlying 
representation issue. Hence, these cases may be read as negating the 
delegation of section 9 authority to some extent, and they virtually 
nullify the application of the rule against relitigation. The con-
43. 413 F.2d 947 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969). 
44. In State Farm, contrary to the situation present in Pepsi, the representation case 
had been transferred to the Board during the § 9 proceeding for resolution by it, 
thereby rendering application of the rule against relitigation clearly proper in the 
subsequent § 8(a)(5) proceeding since it would be useless for the Board to reconsider 
its own determination. 413 F.2d at 949. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 3l!l 
U.S. 146, 158 (1941). 
45. 413 F.2d at 949 (emphasis added). 
46. 415 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1969). 
47. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (Supp. V, 1965-1969), amending 5 U.S.C. § 1007 (1964). 
48. 415 F.2d at 82. 
49. 415 F.2d at 82 (emphasis added). 
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gressional policy underlying section IO of having the NLRB make 
final decisions in unfair labor practice cases seems to have been the 
predominant consideration for these courts. However, the similarly 
important legislative purpose of expediting Board operations, as 
manifested in the 1959 amendment to section 3 of the NLRA,150 was 
at least partially recognized by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
itself in the recent case of NLRB v. Olson Bodies, Incorporated,151 
which modified the strict language found in the Pepsi opinion.152 
The Olson case, which evolved through the familiar Pepsi proce-
dure, 53 concerned the propriety of a previous unreviewed regional-
director determination that a certain challenged individual held a 
supervisory position and was therefore ineligible to vote in a repre-
sentation election.154 Following a summary judgment by the Board 
on the section 8(a)(5) complaint, the company appealed to the Second 
Circuit on the basis of Pepsi and sought remand of the case to the 
Board for a full determination of the status question.55 The court 
denied the requested relief and held that Pepsi did not govern the 
situation. Writing for the court, Judge Friendly interpreted the 
Pepsi language in a restrictive light: 
Accepting Pepsi-Cola we do not regard it as making remand 
automatic whenever the Board has declined to review a decision of 
a regional director under powers delegated to him pursuant to § 3(b). 
This court was there dealing with an issue, whether distributors 
were employees or independent contractors, which, as the Board 
conceded, "is difficult and requires a fine-drawn balancing of facts 
and law" •.•. r;a 
Since the court believed that a relatively simple employee status ques-
tion was involved in Olson, it concluded that the Board had properly 
50. LMRDA § 70I(b), Pub. L. No. 86·257, § 70I(b), 73 Stat. 542, amending NLRA 
§ 3(b), codified in 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1964). See note 2 and text accompanying notes 
2-8 supra. 
51. 420 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. June 9, 
1970) (No. 1670, 1969 Term; renumbered No. 238, 1970 Term). It should be 
noted that the Pepsi and Olson cases were decided by different three-judge panels 
in the Second Circuit: Pepsi was decided by a panel consisting of Chief Judge 
Lumbard, and Circuit Judges Smith and Kaufman; Olson was decided by a panel 
consisting of Circuit Judges Friendly, Smith, and Feinberg. 
52, See text accompanying notes 28 8e 39 supra. 
53. The procedural steps and strategy that led to the Pepsi decision (see 409 F.2d 
at 677-79, and text accompanying notes 13-23 supra) were largely duplicated in the 
first cases of the Pepsi generation (see notes 41-49 supra and accompanying text), and 
are found in Olson (427 F.2d at 116). See also text accompanying notes 62-65 infra. 
54. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 152(11) (1964). 
55. 420 F.2d at 1188-89. 
56. 420 F.2d at 1190 quoting Pepsi at 409 F.2d at 679. Although Judge Friendly did 
not fully discuss the point, his opinion criticized the Pepsi court's prior analysis and 
treatment of the 1959 amendment. 420 F.2d at 1190. 
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incorporated the prior regional-director determination in the unfair 
labor practice case.117 
Although Olson represented a partial retreat from the Pepsi doc-
trine, it did not fully restore the Board's rule against relitigation. 
Nevertheless, the NLRB has continued to adhere to its rule. This 
perseverance was recently rewarded in NLRB v. Magnesium Casting 
Company,58 in which the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit com-
pletely repudiated the Pepsi doctrine. The Supreme Court has 
granted certiorari in Magnesium Casting to resolve this conflict be-
tween the First and Second Circuits.59 
The crucial representation issue involved in Magnesium Casting 
concerned the voting status of seven workers who were employed as 
assistant foremen. The company contended that the men were in-
eligible supervisory personnel.60 The regional director, however, 
ruled that six of the seven assistant foremen were employees rather 
than supervisors, and he therefore included them in the proposed bar-
gaining unit.61 The company's petition for review of the decision 
was denied.62 Following a union election victory, the company sought 
to reopen the issue by refusing to bargain, and the Pepsi procedural 
pattern once again unfolded. The NLRB followed its usual practice 
and summarily issued a bargaining order.63 After denying the com-
pany's request for reconsideration,64 the Board petitioned the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals for enforcement of its bargaining order.65 
The court succinctly formulated the issue as "whether the National 
Labor Relations Board must make its own findings of fact before it 
can conclude that a Company has committed an unfair labor practice 
by its admitted refusal to bargain."66 The court felt that the Pepsi 
holding definitely eliminated that part of the rule against relitigation 
that allowed the Board summarily to find a section 8(a)(5) violation 
without independently deciding the representation issue that orig-
inally prompted the refusal to bargain.67 Although recognizing that 
57. 420 F.2d at 1190. 
58. 427 F.2d 114 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3146 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1970) (No. 
370). 
59. 39 U.S.L.W. 3146 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1970) (No. 370). 
60. 427 F.2d at 116. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 152 (11) (1964). 
61. 427 F.2d at 116. 
62. 427 F.2d at 116. 
63. 427 F.2d at 116. 
64. 427 F.2d at 116. Motions for reconsideration after a Board decision due to 
"extraordinary circumstances" are authorized by the Board's procedural rules. 29 C.F.R. 
§ 102.48(d) (1970). 
65. 427 F.2d at 116. 
66. 427 F.2d at 118. 
67. 427 F.2d at 118-19. 
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it had previously indicated acceptance of the Pepsi doctrine in 
NLRB v. Chelsea Clock Company,68 the court decided to reject com-
pletely both the Pepsi doctrine and the Olson modification.69 
The court analyzed the Pepsi problem almost exclusively in terms 
of the history and policy behind the 1959 amendment to section 3 of 
the Act. It acknowledged and then discounted the reasoning behind 
the Pepsi holding: 
Viewing the problem as tabula rasa, there may be some merit to 
the proposition that discretionary review by the Board is not a 
sufficient guarantee of the exercise of the expertise attributed to the 
Board; that section IO(c) of the Act requires the Board to make its 
own determinations of fact in unfair labor practice cases ..• ; and 
that Congressional rejection of proposals to delegate final authority 
to hearing examiners suggests a similar reluctance to delegate such 
authority to Regional Directors .... 
But the slate was etched rather clearly, we think, when Congress 
amended section 3(b) of the Act 29 U.S.C. § 153(b ), in 1959.70 
Contrary to the Second Circuit's position in Pepsi, the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals believed that this amendment was designed to per-
mit regional directors to make decisions with final effect.71 It con-
cluded that the delegation provision indicated a congressional will-
ingness to allow the Board to authorize delegates to act in its place.72 
This equation of Board and delegate authority led the court to 
reject the company's contention, based on the Pepsi holding, that 
the 1959 amendment on its face limits the regional directors to the 
exercise of section 9 powers and thus leaves determination of unfair 
labor practice issues solely to the Board under section 10. The court 
noted that it is well established that the Board is not required to 
reconsider issues decided by it in section 9 proceedings when they 
arise in related subsequent unfair labor practice cases.73 It therefore 
reasoned that a decision by a regional director acting in the Board's 
stead under the authority of the section 3(b) delegation should be af-
forded the same effect in a subsequent unfair labor practice case, 
even when Board review is denied.74 
68. 411 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1969). See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra. 
69. 427 F.2d at 119. 
70. 427 F.2d at 119 {emphasis added). 
71. A regional director's "determination-when not set aside by the :Board-is 
entitled to the same weight in the subsequent proceeding that the :Board's own 
determination would have been accorded." 427 F.2d at 119. 
72. 427 F.2d at 119. 
73. 427 F.2d at 119. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146 (1941). 
74. 427 F.2d at 119. See also Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLR:B, 365 F.2d 
898, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1966), in which the court noted that the practical effect of the rule 
against relitigation was to carry over "the earlier :Board practice precluding relitigation 
in a 'related' unfair labor practice hearing of an issue determined in a representation 
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In the eyes of the First Circuit, this conclusion was supported by 
the legislative history of the 1959 amendment.75 From the court's 
analysis of that history, it drew two important conclusions: first, the 
amendment reflects a congressional judgment that regional directors 
possess sufficient ability with respect to representation issues that the 
Board's expertise need be exercised only through a narrow dis-
cretionary review; and second, the primary purpose of the amend-
ment was to expedite final resolution of representation questions.76 
The court reasoned that implementation of these congressional poli-
cies was most fully accomplished through complete operation of the 
Board's rule against relitigation: "Thus, while the Company's inter-
pretation-based on Pepsi-Cola-would expedite only elections and 
certification but not the disposition of the issues resolved therein, 
the Board's interpretation makes it unnecessary to redetermine each 
of those issues [in subsequent unfair labor practice proceedings], 
thereby effectuating the Congressional purpose more completely."77 
It is apparent that the Pepsi, Olson, and Magnesium Casting 
courts had disparate conceptions of the congressional desires mani-
fested in the enactment of the pertinent provisions of the NLRA. 
Although each court utilized a rationale founded upon interpreta-
tions of the same legislative histories-concerning sections 3 and IO of 
the NLRA-in order to support its conclusions, they reached widely 
divergent results. It may be instructive to examine afresh those legis-
lative histories and to determine the relevant congressional considera-
tions; an attempt may then be made to accommodate the opposing 
policies involved with the Board's application of its rule against 
relitigation. 
It is clear from the legislative history that surrounded the passage 
of sections 9 and IO of the original NLRA that Congress intended 
that the Board make the ultimate agency determinations in all repre-
sentation and unfair labor practice cases. 78 Congress recognized the 
inherent difficulties present during the formative years of an in-
novative administrative scheme and desired that the NLRB de-
velop a uniform body of labor law through the exercise of its 
particular expertise.79 However, important developments that oc-
hearing, even though now the representation determination may have been made by 
the Regional Director." This case is discussed in text accompanying notes 105-07 infra. 
75. The legislative history is discussed in text accompanying notes 83-96 infra. 
76. 427 F.2d at 120. 
77. 427 F.2d at 120. 
78. See 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Ac:r 
2233, 2352, 3222 (1935). 
79. 105 CONG. R.Ec. 8873 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Kearns), in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING 8: DISCLOSURE Ac:r OF 1959, 1749-50 
(1959) [hereinafter l.EGIS. HIST. LMRDA]. 
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curred over the twenty-four years following passage of the NLRA 80 
indicated to Congress that it was no longer necessary or desirable to 
reqmre the Board itself to determine all representation and unfair 
labor practice cases.81 These developments culminated in the 1959 
amendment that was incorporated into section 3(b),82 and which 
gave rise to the Pepsi problem. 
An examination of the legislative history behind the 1959 amend-
ment83 reveals that while the amendment to section 3(b) of the 
.NLRA received substantial congressional attention in some respects, 
there was no direct consideration of the potential effect of that 
amendment on section 10. The concern that first prompted Congress 
to consider the delegation authorization was the Board's increas-
ingly heavy workload of representation and unfair labor practice 
cases. This excessive caseload led the Board to refuse to exercise the 
full scope of its jurisdiction and thereby to create the "no-man's 
land" problem.84 The no-man's land consisted of those disputes over 
which the Board possessed exclusive jurisdiction-thus pre-empting 
state jurisdiction-but over which the Board refused to assert juris-
diction in order to reduce its caseload, on the ground of their in-
substantial effect on commerce.85 The first appearance of the section 
3(b) amendment was in a draft bill introduced by Representative 
Kearns of Pennsylvania.86 H.R. 8342, the House committee's bill, 
80. Perhaps the most significant development was the accumulation of a substantial 
body of precedent based on actual NLRB experience in deciding representation and 
other labor problems. The compilation of such precedent in the NLRB's own reports 
and the establishment of uniform rules on procedure and decision-making based on 
actual Board experience made it reasonable in most representation and unfair labor 
practice cases for the Board to rely upon the determination of its delegates, since it 
could generally be confident that such agents were applying the relevant law. See 
notes 89-90 infra and accompanying text. Another development prompting the 
change in congressional opinion was the size of the Board's caseload and the emergence 
of the "no-man's land" problem. See notes 84-85 infra and accompanying text. 
81. 105 CoNG. REc. 8873 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Kearns), in 2 LEGIS. HIST. LMRDA 
1749-50. 
82. See note 2 supra. 
83. The 1959 amendment to NLRA § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1964), is set out in 
note 2 supra and discussed in the text accompanying notes 2-8 supra, 
84. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1959), in 1 LEGis. HIST. LMRDA 
775. 
85. The Supreme Court held in Guss v. Utah Labor Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1956), that 
the Board possessed exclusive jurisdiction over all labor problems that affect commerce. 
The practical effect of Guss and the Board's policy of refusing to exercise jurisdiction 
over cases it felt lacked an appreciable effect on commerce was to exclude many small 
employers and unions from the protection and services of the NLRB. Since state 
agencies could not take jurisdiction, such excluded parties were left in a no-man's land 
without a source of administrative or judicial remedy. The resolution of this 
problem was an important factor in the development of the 1959 amendment that 
authorized the delegation of § 9 powers. Congress also dealt with this problem by 
amending § 14 of the NRLA to provide for the assumption of jurisdiction by state 
agencies and courts over cases declined by the NLRB. LMRDA § 701(a), Pub. L. No. 
86-257, § 70l(a), '73 Stat. 541, amending NLRA § 14, codified in 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) 
(1964). 
86. H.R. 7265, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), in 1 LEGIS. HIST. LMRDA 591. 
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included the identical provision,87 and the final draft contained 
the amendment as originally proposed except for the addition of 
three minor words of clarification. 88 Representative Kearns de-
scribed his proposed amendment to section 3(b) as one of three 
suggested changes designed to "increase the Board's capacity and 
to provide faster processing of N.L.R.B. cases."89 Recognizing that 
in the early period of the NLRA's history it was necessary and de-
sirable for the Board itself to handle representation cases, Kearns 
emphasized that after twenty years of experience the rules of decision 
were firmly established and that most representation cases were de-
cided on precedent. He therefore felt that the handling of such 
matters could safely and profitably be delegated to Board subordi-
nates, thereby relieving the Board of primary responsibility over an 
area that accounted for over half of its burgeoning workload.90 The 
House committee similarly emphasized the desirable expediting 
effect that adoption of the proposed amendment would have on 
Board operations, and it related this result to alleviation of the "no-
man's land" dilemma.91 
The Senate was also cognizant of the problems exacerbated by 
the increasing Board caseload, and initially sought a solution that 
would have authorized the NLRB to utilize the services of state labor 
agencies for the resolution of no-man's land cases.92 However, after 
the introduction of the Kearns bill in the House, the Senate's atten-
tion shifted to the section 9 delegation concept as a means of gen-
erally lightening the Board's workload while improving its efli-
ciency. 93 Subsequent Senate consideration tended to focus primarily 
on the expediting effect the House proposal would have on Board 
operations and only secondarily on its effect on the "no-man's land" 
problem. Thus, Senator Dirksen pointed out that the delegation of 
power would result in "more expeditious" handling of labor cases,94 
87. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1959), in I I..EcIS. HIST. LMRDA 747. 
88. LMRDA § 70I(b), Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 70l(b), 73 Stat. 542, amending NLRA 
§ 3(b), codified in 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1964). The words of clarification consisted of the 
phrase, "of section 9," after the reference to the provisions for directing an election 
and taking a secret ballot. 
89. 105 CONG. REc. 8873-74 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Kearns), in 2 I..EG1s. Hisr. 
LMRDA 1749-50. The other proposed changes were an increase in Board size to seven 
members and delegation of purely administrative responsibilities to the Board's General 
Counsel. 
90. 105 CoNG. REc. 8873 (1959) (remarks of R.ep. Keams), in 2 I..EcIS. HIST. LMRDA 
1749·50. 
91. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1959), in 1 1..Ec1s. HIST. LMRDA 
775. See notes 80 8: 85 supra. 
92. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1959), in I I..EcIS. HIST. LMRDA 422. 
93. 105 CONG. REc. 14,988 (1959) (remarks of Senator Morse), in 2 LEGIS. HIST. 
LMRDA 825-26. It should be noted that Senator Morse was a member of the conference 
committee that produced the final version of the LMRDA. 2 LECIS. HIST. LMRDA 
1400. 
94. 105 CoNG. REc. 17,918 (1959) (remarks of Senator Dirksen), in 2 I..EcIS. HIST. 
LMRDA 1452. 
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and Senator Goldwater said that the section 3(b) amendment was 
"designed to expedite final disposition of cases by the Board, by 
turning over part of its caseload to its regional directors for final 
determination."95 Similarly, the final House comment on this legis-
lation stressed the amendment's expediting effect rather than the 
jurisdictional considerations. 96 
As the legislative history therefore clearly indicates, the logical 
and intended result of the delegation amendment was to allow the 
regional directors to make final decisions on most representation 
questions. While there was some congressional concern over possible 
deviation from established Board practice or arbitrary action by 
regional directors, the availability of discretionary review by the 
Board under the amendment97 was believed to be a sufficient safe-
guard against such dangers.98 Therefore, Congress clearly contem-
plated that except when the Board felt it necessary to review a 
particular problem, regional-director decisions under section 9 would 
be regarded as final. 99 
This conclusion concerning section 3(b) does not, however, 
provide a complete answer to the question presented by the decisions 
construing the rule against relitigation in Pepsi, 0 Ison, and Magne-
sium Casting. The Board's application of the rule, as approved in 
Magnesium Casting,100 tends to negate the policy expressed in sec-
tion 10 of the Act that the Board shall decide unfair labor practice 
cases. It was this policy that concerned the Pepsi court. 
Thus, neither Pepsi nor Magnesium Casting satisfactorily resolves 
the rule-against-relitigation problem because both cases tend to 
exaggerate the importance of one congressional policy at the expense 
of another and to neglect the significance of the factual pattern in-
volved. The failure of the Pepsi court lies in the stress it places on 
the policy embodied in section IO(c) that the NLRB should make its 
own determination of fact in unfair labor practice cases and the 
95. 105 CONG. REc. A8522 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1959) (remarks of Senator Goldwater), in 
2 LEGIS. HIST. LMRDA 1856. 
96. 105 CoNG. REc. 18,128 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Barden), in 2 LEGIS. Hisr. LMRDA 
1714. 
97. See NLRA § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1964), set out in note 2 supra. 
98. 105 CONG. REc. 18,153 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Barden), in 2 LEcrs. HIST. LMRDA 
1812; 105 CONG. REc. 18,152 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Griffin), in 2 LEGIS. Hisr. LMRDA 
1811; 105 CONG. R.Ec. 8873-74 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Kearns), in 2 LEcrs. Hisr. LMRDA 
1749-50; 105 CONG. REc. A8522 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1959) (remarks of Senator Goldwater), 
in 2 LEGIS. Hisr. LMRDA 1856. 
99. 105 CONG. REC. 14,988 (1959) (remarks of Senator Morse), in 2 LEGIS. HIST. 
LMRDA 1327; 105 CoNG. REc. A8522 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1959) (remarks of Senator Gold-
water), in 2 LEGis. Hrsr. LMRDA 1856. That the regional director's decisions were to be 
final subject only to discretionary review was evidenced, in the opinion of the Second 
Circuit in Magnesium Casting, by exactly this concern over possible deviation from 
established precedent. See 427 F.2d at 120 n.4. 
100. 427 F.2d at 121. 
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court's correlative disregard of the section 3 policy.101 Under the 
Pepsi doctrine, any employer involved in a representation proceeding 
can effectively negate the expediting purpose of the 1959 amend-
ment since by refusing to bargain he can force a relitigation of 
issues resolved by a regional director in a previous representation 
proceeding and thus achieve substantial delay.102 
However, the First Circuit's holding in Magnesium Casting is 
subject to similar criticism because it advances the expediting goal 
of the section 3(b) amendment at the expense of the section 10 policy. 
In fact, language in that case, if taken literally, would permit the 
Board to utilize the rule against relitigation in collateral-estoppel 
situations when the subsequent section 10 case involves a matter 
other than a refusal to bargain.103 For although the court mentioned 
the prior Board practice regarding unfair labor practice cases arising 
subsequent to a section 9 determination, it failed to stress that such 
subsequent proceedings must be related to the original representa-
tion issue.104 In Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB,105 the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the rule 
against relitigation could not be applied in a section 10 case that 
did not arise from an employer's refusal to bargain, in order to 
challenge a regional director's section 9 determination.106 Thus, for 
example, under the Amalgamated approach the rule against relitiga-
tion could be applied in a section 8(a)(5) case in which the employer 
claimed that the regional director had improperly classified an in-
dividual as an "employee"; but it could not be applied in a section 
8(a)(3) case in which the employer justified a discriminatory discharge 
of an individual, whom the regional director had included in the 
bargaining unit, on the ground that he was not an "employee."107 
Under the Pepsi approach the rule against relitigation could not 
be applied in either situation; the Magnesium Casting language, on 
101, 427 F.2d at 121. The court's emphasis in Pepsi on Board determination of unfair 
labor practices overlooks the practical aspects of the agency's operations. As recognized 
by the Pepsi court, most § 10 disputes are resolved, not by the Board, but rather by 
a trial examiner, whose decision is generally subjected to only pro forma review, 
resulting in the Board's "rubber stamp acceptance" of his determination. 409 F.2d 
at 679. In such situations, Board consideration of the underlying issues is probably 
no more comprehensive than that afforded regional-director decisions in representation 
cases. Thus, the Pepsi doctrine would not necesarily guarantee that substantially greater 
Board attention would be given to representation issues in § 8(a)(5) cases. 
102. See note 53 supra. 
103, 427 F.2d at 119. 
104. See note 7 supra. 
105. ll65 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
106. ll65 F.2d at 904-05. See also NLRB v. Union Bros., Inc., 403 F.2d 883 (4th 
Cir. 1968), and Leonard Niederriter Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 113 (1961), discussed in note 
7 supra. 
107. "Employee" is defined in NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964). Employees 
are entitled to certain rights under NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964). 
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the other hand, would permit the rule to be applied in both cases. 
While the Pepsi approach would interfere with the expeditious 
handling of Board affairs, the Magnesium Casting approach would 
enable regional directors to make final decisions that would be 
binding on subsequent unfair labor practice proceedings that are 
unrelated to representation controversies and hence that were not 
anticipated at the time of the earlier determinations. It is the failure 
of the courts to perceive properly the significance of the "related" re-
quirement of the rule that makes both decisions unsatisfactory.108 
Nevertheless, whenever the factual pattern of a case involves the 
correct operational parameters of the rule, the Magnesium Casting 
decision provides the preferable approach.109 It furthers the more 
recently expressed congressional policy of expediting Board opera-
tions and, used in the allowable manner, effectively frustrates at-
tempts to delay the resolution of representation problems. The 
Pepsi approach, however, tends to promote delay since any repre-
sentation dispute can be easily continued in a subsequent unfair 
labor practice case by a mere refusal to bargain. Once a section 8(a)(5) 
charge is filed, a dilatory party can successfully delay to the extent 
of the time required for the Board to determine that the section 9 
decision was correct and "not merely whether it was clearly er-
roneous."110 Even after being directed by a court of appeals to apply 
this stiffer standard of review, it is highly probable that the Board, 
having at least twice confirmed the prior decision,111 would continue 
to uphold its agent. Further delay would result if the problem were 
again forced back to the courts by a continued employer refusal to 
comply with the bargaining order. Thus, courts applying the Pepsi 
doctrine may tend to aid those seeking such delay since, by virtue 
of the remoteness of the Board's reversing its delegate on remand and 
the party's obstinance, a judicial resolution of the representation 
dispute will ultimately be required. Such delay, however, could be 
prevented if the court would simply delete the intermediate remand 
step and use the information contained in the record that is made 
available to it under section 9(d) of the Act to resolve the issue.112 
108. See note 7 supra. Substantial support for the current interpretation of the 
"related" unfair labor practice requirement is found in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. 
NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 158 (1941), in which the Supreme Court noted that a § 8(a)(5) 
proceeding such as that in Pepsi is merely a continuation of the prior representation 
dispute. Although this case long preceded the formal rule against relitigation, it 
pertained to the prior decisional practice of the Board that accomplished the same 
results. 
109. See Meyer Dairy, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 697, 700 (10th Cir. 1970), in which 
Magnesium Casting's interpretation of congressional policy was accepted. 
110. Pepsi-Cola Buffalo Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 676, 676 (2d Cir. 1969). 
111. The first affirmance occurs when § 9 review is denied, and the second when 
the Board adopts the trial examiner's decision, which is based on summary acceptance 
of the original regional-director determination. 
112. See NLRA § 9(d), 29 U.S.C. § I59(d) (1964), which provides for the certification 
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Despite the expediting policy of the 1959 amendments, the under-
lying policy of section IO is still valid to the extent that it requires 
the Board to decide true unfair labor practice cases. The concern 
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals over the NLRB's seeming 
avoidance of this requirement through application of the rule against 
relitigation may best be countered by the realization that cases like 
Pepsi are actually only extended representation proceedings that Con-
gress intended to allow regional directors to decide. In this respect, 
the Olson case113-which actually nullifies Pepsi's effect on routine 
representation problems-is a useful accommodation of the com-
peting policies involved in sections 3 and 10. That is, Olson reminds 
the Board that its discretionary power of review need only be exer-
cised when novel and difficult representation problems arise for 
which there is insufficient guiding precedent. Absent such rare cir-
cumstances, regional directors should be able to decide finally repre-
sentation issues; when not reviewed, their determinations should, 
through application of the rule against relitigation, govern in subse-
quent related unfair labor practice proceedings, such as those in-
volved in Pepsi and Magnesium Casting. 
of the entire Board record to the court on a review request. See Comment, 44 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 1184, 1189 n.28 (1969). See generally 1 NLRB, LEcrs. HIST. OF THE LABOR MANAGE• 
MENT RELATIONS Acr oF 1947 (1947); NLRA §§ 9, 10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 159, 160 (1964). 
11!1. See notes 51-57 supra and accompanying text. 
